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THE CASE FOR A GREATER FEDERAL
ROLE IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION FIELD: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE POLLUTION PROBLEM AND
THE CONSTITUTION
BY PAUL EMOND*
I. Introduction
Canadians are faced today with an environmental crisis of major
proportions. Even if we discount all but the most optimistic predictions about
the future of our natural environment it is clear that we must move quickly to
ensure that a favourable ecological balance is found. Yet one of the major
stumbling blocks to effective environmental action is the apparently confusing
and often contradictory way in which the BNA Act divides legislative respon-
sibility between the provincial and federal governments. Until we know who is
and should be responsible for what, it is impossible to hold either level of
government accountable.
But the question of legislative responsibility for pollution abatement is not
an easy one to answer. Because the constitutional draftsmen did not recognize
pollution as a problem, whatever principles we can glean from a constitutional
inquiry will not necessarily point to a single solution. Judicial interpretation of
one head of legislative power often suggests one answer, while interpretation of
another suggests a completely different one. Thus, the constitution itself lacks
a sense of coherency of purpose. Even assuming it is possible to extract certain
coherent principles of legislative responsibility from an analysis of the constitu-
tion and subsequent judicial interpretation, this may not necessarily correspond
to the realities of the problem. Pollution was not an issue in 1867 and there is
no reason to think that heads of the BNA Act that seem to touch on the problem
reflect a conscious national effort to assign legislative competence between the
two levels of government.
Pollution means different things to different people. To some it is primarily
an economic problem, to others it is a social malaise, and to still others it is
some combination of the two. Given such diverse and often conflicting defini-
tions of pollution, it is almost impossible to identify the components of the
problem that will enable us to suggest an optimal sharing of legislative power.
Thus, whether we begin with the constitution and try to extract principles that
suggest an appropriate sharing of powers to deal with pollution, or whether we
begin with the problem and try to identify the component parts which can then
be fitted into the existing division of power framework, we come up against the
same impasse. Neither the constitution nor the problem suggest any easy
*Member of the 1972 Graduating Class, Osgoode Hall Law School of York
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solutions. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the most profitable way to tackle
the problem is to begin with an analysis of the scope of the problem1 and then
look at the constitutional heads of power that touch on it. The constitution will
not tell us precisely how to deal with this problem, but it will set the parameters
within which any suggested solution must fall.
II. Pollution: Two Dimensions
Pollution is not a single problem. It is not just fouled water or dirty air;
rather it encompasses almost every aspect of our daily living. It is an aesthetic
problem, a noise problem, a planning problem. It is not useful to list all the
manifestations of pollution-there are hundreds. What is useful is to try to
delineate its major dimensions, and in this regard there seem to be two: an
economic and a social one.
(a) The Economic Dimension
The economic argument is a familiar one2 and runs as follows. Pollution
control is directly opposed to economic growth in the sense that as the controls
on production become stricter, growth becomes more expensive and therefore
less attractive. Tough controls force companies, governments and individuals
to internalize many costs such as sewage treatment that were formerly external-
ized into the environment. When people are forced to absorb these costs and
include them in the price of the product, the product becomes more expensive
and less competitive, and eventually all the facilities associated with the produc-
tion and distribution of that product begin to decline. When we consider that
we are living in a highly competitive world in which great emphasis is placed on
costs per unit, efficiency, and balance of trade, pollution abatement is not very
attractive from an economic point of view. There is little incentive to start
cleaning up your own environment if your neighbour can continue to pollute
and reap the economic benefits by successfully competing against you.
By not passing tough pollution laws, it may be possible for governments
to lure new businesses into their jurisdiction, this in turn tends to create an
anti-depollution competition among governments. The competition may be
confined initially to a local area but pressures will force this competition to
spread beyond local boundaries and encompass provinces and even states.
Pollution may be confined to one locality, but because each locality is linked
economically, pollution control or the lack of it in one area has important
consequences for each other area. Companies in the same industry all compete
in the same markets. If one company in one jurisdiction is allowed to pollute
at will, its costs will be less than those of another company in another juris-
diction which must treat its wastes and will have a substantial advantage over
its competitors. Unless the pollution is so serious as to disrupt other economic
1This is an approach suggested by Lyon and Atkey, in Canadian Constitutional Law
in a Modern Perspective (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971) at 680. [hereinafter
Lyon, Canadian Constitution].
2The most recent exposition of it is contained in The Joint Committee of The
House of Commons and Senate Report on The Constitution (Queen's Printer, 1972)[hereinafter The MacGuigan Report].
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activity, there is no economic incentive for the responsible government to
impose tough pollution controls for its citizens are enjoying the benefits of
high employment and prosperity. Economic pressure is on the environmentally
conscious province to relax its anti-pollution laws so that its companies may
compete successfully in national and international markets.
A point that is often made in connection with these arguments is the
universality of the pollution problem. Many types of air and water pollution
transcend provincial boundaries, thus making a decision to clean up by one
province doubly expensive. For example, if a lower stream province imple-
ments strong antipollution laws and an upper stream province refuses to adopt
a similar policy, the lower stream province will have to bear the cost of both
its own and its neighbour's pollution. Even if this province does not decide to
clean up its rivers, it is forced to bear the burden of living with another
jurisdiction's garbage.
The lack of any economic incentives to clean up, the spillover
consequences emanating from the competitiveness of pollution control, and
the major interprovincial aspects of pollution all suggest that it makes good
sense economically to give the federal government primary responsibility
for the problem. The federal government can provide the incentive to clean
up by making it more economically attractive to curb pollution. If the whole
country embarks on a pollution control program, no particular province or
community is handicapped by destructive competition. The economic argu-
ments favouring federal control break down into three parts-the federal
government's broad overview of the problem, its ability to design and imple-
ment uniform incentives and its resources to pay for a solution.
Because the federal government has the unique ability to assess and deal
with the economic well being of the country as a whole, it should have
responsibility for such economically important activities as pollution control.
By adopting appropriate pollution abatement standards Parliament can ensure
the economic viability of the country, while making an appreciable contribu-
tion to pollution control. Similarly, federal responsibility to alleviate regional
economic disparity also suggests that federal involvement in pollution should
be paramount.
Closely linked with the first point is the government's ability to deal with
a lack of incentive for pollution abatement. The MacGuigan Report rational-
ized federal control primarily in terms of this point. It argues:
Because of the disparities in economic terms between the Provinces in Canada, to
fail to have a paramount federal power would be to invite Provinces to compete
for industrial development on the basis of more relaxed pollution laws. It is only
recognizing the obvious to suggest that some economically weaker Provinces would
be unable to resist the temptations.3
Rather than leaving market forces to create a disincentive for pollution
control, the Report argues that the federal government must provide the
incentive by negotiating or imposing a uniform solution on the provinces.
Such a solution could be in terms of economic incentives such as tax advan-
3Id., at 92.
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tages or effluent fees, or it may take the form of absolute'or qualified prohibi-
tions of certain deleterious substances.
Finally, although the argument that the government with the financial
resources should assume responsibility has an obvious flaw in it, it is a
convincing one. Rationally, there is no reason why the most prosperous
government is best suited to deal with the problem. In fact, if that argument
is taken to its logical extreme, the federal government would have primary
responsibility for almost all problems because it has unlimited taxing power.
But the concept of federalism is based on the idea that one level of government
is able to deal with certain problems better than another level because each
problem is peculiar to the constituency that each government represents.
Unless some attempt is made to determine whether or not a problem properly
comes under the purview of a particular level of government the federal
process becomes a sham. Nevertheless, the argument must not be dismissed
too quickly. Because the present resource balance between governments is
less than optimally flexible, a solution that does not deviate dramatically
from this recognized fact must be sought.
From an economic perspective almost every pollution problem affects
all Canadians. Since the federal government represents the whole country, it
follows that it should have the responsibility for finding and implementing an
appropriate solution. Federal control means the ability to design "an all
encompassing multi-use agency that most administrators feel would be ideal."4
From an economic point of view this makes a great deal of sense.
(b) The Social Dimension
It is a gross oversimplification to think of pollution as merely an economic
problem, for if the social aspects of pollution are overlooked, one's view of
the most appropriate legislative solution can be distorted. An important link
between pollution control and the values held by social groups exists and may
be verified by examining the history of some of the earlier abatement laws.
Pollution control began at the level of government which was most responsive
to the needs of relatively small groups of people, the municipal government.
Most city noise ordinances for example date back to the 1930's5 long before
noise pollution had become a fashionable topic for debate. Anti-dumping
bylaws also originated with local governments, some as far back as the
nineteenth century. By tracing the development of provincial involvement
with pollution control in Ontario, one sees that the Ontario Water Resources
Commission only assumed control over water pollution from municipal
governments that lacked either the financial ability or the desire to solve
serious sewage disposal or water supply problems. Not only were municipal
governments the first to become concerned, but each became involved in ways
that best exemplified the social needs of their constituents. Some cities such
as Toronto emphasized abatement and control while others such as Montreal
4D. Gibson, Constitutional Context of Canadian Water Planning (1969), 7 Alberta L.
Rev. 71 at 86.
5The City of Toronto noise bylaw, Bylaw 14913, adopted by City Council
March 14, 1938.
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did not.6 Local and provincial involvement in the pollution problem has
preceded federal interest and local solutions have varied according to the
social aspirations of the local group. Both phenomena suggest that pollution
has an important and even dominant local or regional aspect to it.
Consider for a moment just how many parts of the problem are local or
regional in nature. Land use and land use planning fall into this category.
Included here are such environmental issues as zoning ordinances, regulation
of sand, gravel and limestone pits and quarries and provision for solid waste
disposal and land fill operations. Questions of aesthetics, noise pollution and
most aspects of air pollution are also local issues. Water supplies and waste
disposal have traditionally been a municipal concern and all but the most
serious sources of industrial pollution have been under local or regional
jurisdiction. Most regulation of recreational activities such as pleasure boating,
snowmobiling and cottaging is also dealt with at the provincial level. Each of
these aspects of pollution that are regulated at the local and provincial levels
are all manifestations of the social aspect of pollution that is so closely tied
to the social well-being of individuals and groups.
The emphasis on the social dimension naturally leads us to the conclusion
that local and hence provincial governments should have primary legislative
responsibility for the problem. Because local governments represent a reason-
ably well defined group with identifiable social needs, they have a special
appreciation of the problems and therefore should have the responsibility to
find and implement solutions to them. These governments are better able to
assess and reconcile the conflicting aspirations within their society. They are
directly accountable to the people who will be affected by their decisions and
will adopt solutions that are socially acceptable. Indeed, when one focusses
on the social aspect of pollution, federal interests are much less important.
But of course this line of reasoning can only take us so far. Up to a point
different groups can choose different life styles, but after that, one group's
choice will spill over and have some adverse effects on another group. As we
pointed out earlier, pollution in its broadest sense knows no boundaries and
one group's chosen life style may detract from another's. In this same vein, it
is also clear that a decision to sacrifice environmental protection in favour of
a higher economic standard of living must be limited to decisions which will
not seriously impair any groups well-being. It would be unconscionable not
to put some limits on the amounts and kinds of pollution one group can
choose to live with. Thus, constraints must be imposed for the well-being of
other societal groups affected by pollution as well as for the protection of the
group that chooses economic development at the expense of the environment.
6The City of Toronto, for example, provides primary and secondary treatment for
100% of its sewage. Montreal dumps 91.6% of its sewage untreated into the St. Lawrence
River. Instead of spending heavily on an Expo and preparation for the Olympics, Toronto
has been busy building sewage treatment plants, and separating its storm and sanitary
sewers.
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Looking first at spillover effects, it is apparent that not all kinds of
pollution affect adjacent groups. For example urban planning, noise, and
aesthetics seem to be rather localized in terms of their effects. We may abhor
the planning policies of a particular area but surely that is its choice. They
have to live with these policies and if that is what they want, that is what they
should get. Other kinds of pollution such as air and water pollution are not
confined to the source area. Various kinds of effluents and emissions travel
great distances and can often have a rather dramatic effect on the quality of
life in communities several and sometimes even hundreds of miles away.
This pollution easily transcends municipal boundaries and occasionally
provincial and national boundaries. For example, most people would find it
offensive that one group can, for purposes of maximizing their own enjoyment,
substantially interfere with the enjoyment of another group. One example that
immediately comes to mind within the municipal context is the nickel refineries
at Sudbury. It would almost be most unfair to give the tiny towns of Copper
Cliff and Falconbridge primary legislative responsibility over the air pollution
emitted from the refineries in these two towns. The air pollution affects so
many people that are unable to participate in the town decision-making
process, it would be unreasonable to leave their fate in the hands of these
municipal officials. Society demands involvement from a higher level of
government to represent the interests of these affected people-in this case
the provincial government. However, given such an enormous problem with
such profound effects on so many people, it might be possible to carry this
argument one step further and suggest that the federal government should
become involved in the problem. Parliament has an interest in protecting the
general well-being of all Canadians and if one group begins affecting the well-
being of a large enough group of Canadians then it seems that Parliament
not only has the power but the responsibility to intervene and regulate the
problem. An easier case conceptually is mercury contamination or D.D.T.
In both cases the spillover effects are so obvious and so adverse that we do
not hesitate to demand federal legislation to control them.
The distinction between spillovers that adversely affect large numbers
of people and problems affecting the social well-being of all Canadians easily
becomes blurred. These spillovers almost invariably create a serious health
problem for the group creating the problem as well as for those affected
by it. In the health sphere the federal government clearly has legislative
competence. It certainly extends into the area of food and drugs and would
perhaps cover pollution that has a less direct effect on health. Many kinds of
industrial pollution fall into this category. Thus, the social aspects of pollution
point in the direction of local or provincial legislative responsibility with the
caveat that when spillover effects become great or the pollution seriously
threatens the well-being of Canadians, Parliament should have concurrent
legislative responsibility.
(c) The Interdependence of the Economic and Social Dimensions
While examining pollution in terms of an economic and a social
dimension may be useful to the extent that it highlights the main character-
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istics of the subject matter, it is important to note that these two characteristics
are not mutually exclusive. It is impossible to separate one from the other.
It is possible to identify each characteristic, but they are both so closely
related to each other that we cannot assign legislative responsibility over
one aspect to one level of government and responsibility over the second
aspect to the other government. Federal regulation of the economics of
pollution will have a profound effect on the social aspects of the problem
and vice versa. This, of course, should come as no surprise. It is typical of
most highly complex problems. In some ways, economic regulation will affect
social policies because social well-being is intimately tied up with economic
prosperity. And the social aspect has, as one of its many components, an
economic element. If we focus on the social aspect, it seems clear that
policies in this area may encourage or discourage economic development
depending on the kind of life style to be promoted by that policy.
This interrelationship does not extend to all parts of pollution control.
It is easy to envisage, for example, that such economically related activities
as the regulation of navigation or control over works and improvements on
navigable lakes and rivers will not interfere substantially with the social
aspects of pollution. Nor is there any direct relationship between the regulation
of aesthetics or some kinds of land-use planning and economic interests in
pollution. Within certain narrowly defined areas, regulation of one aspect
of pollution will be confined to that aspect and the spillover will be minimal.
For the most part, however, the overlap between the two aspects is con-
siderable.
(d) A Suggested Solution
If pollution does break down into an economic and social dimension
which are in turn a reflection of the pervasive and particularistic character-
istics of the problem, what does this mean in terms of an optimal solution
to the question of legislative responsibility? The answer is fairly obvious.
The Federal and Provincial governments should share responsibility with the
Federal responsibility confined to regulating the economic and the broad,
social well being aspects of pollution and the provincial responsibility confined
to finding particular solutions to particular pollution problems. Theoretically
then, the federal government should design a broad framework that establishes
certain minimum standards for pollution control that would solve the
economic and larger social problems and the provincial and local governments
should direct their efforts at refining or upgrading these standards so that
they better reflect the social needs of their constituents. Such a solution
requires a high degree of co-operation between the two levels of government.
It also envisages a much broader federal role in the overall solution than we
have seen in the past. Constitutional limitations, however, may preclude the
federal government from assuming such broad regulatory powers. The
next section will explore the extent to which the constitution permits us to
construct such a solution and examine the legal details of the solution.
1972]
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III. The Constitutional Implications of an Expanded Federal Pollution
Control Role7
Before looking at the existing constitutional framework for pollution
control, it is important to identify three main themes that run throughout
the following analysis and are of special relevance to pollution control. These
three themes are: (1) the socio-economic paradox of the BNA Act, (2) the
confused legislative responsibility for the problem and (3) the recent enlarge-
ment of federal powers.
Because pollution divides neatly into an economic and social dimension,
it follows that we should look at the constitutional heads of power from a
socio-economic perspective. However, when we adopt this approach, we
discover an interesting paradox. From our previous discussion, one would
expect that because the economic aspects of pollution seem to fall naturally
under federal jurisdiction, federal power to deal with environmental problems
would emanate from those heads of the BNA Act that purport to confer on
Parliament the power to regulate the economy. But the constitutional head
dealing with the economic sphere, the trade and commerce power, has never
received liberal, expansive treatment at the hands of the courts, and therefore,
cannot support federal initiative in the pollution area. In fact, to the extent
that the federal government relies on the trade and commerce power, one
can predict with some degree of certainty that these attempts will be doomed
to failure. The federal government's social interest in the problem, on the
other hand, is important but not extensive; it is confined to a general concern
for the well-being of all Canadians. Yet the constitutional powers that seem
to be designed to deal with these social interests, namely the peace order
and good government and criminal law powers have recently been trans-
formed from relatively narrow, well-defined powers to very expansive ones.
It is on the basis of these "social" powers8 that the federal government will
most likely find the authority to deal with what for it is primarily an economic
problem.
The second comment that should be made is closely related to the first
point. Because of the paradox and apparent contradiction within the constitu-
tion, political responsibility over pollution is obscure. Both governments have
7The following articles were very useful to me in the preparation of this section:
D. Gibson, Constitutional Context of Canadian Water Planning (1969), 7 Alberta L.
Rev. 71 [hereinafter Gibson, Constitutional Context]; B. Laskin, "Jurisdictional Frame-
work for Water Management", Resources for Tomorrow Conference (1961), Background
Papers 211 [hereinafter, Laskin, "Jurisdictional Framework"]; L. McGrady, Jurisdiction
for Water Resource Development (1967), 2 Man. L. Journal 219 [hereinafter McGrady,
Water Resource]; B. A. Stamp, "Constitutional Problems of Interprovincial Rivers", in
D. Gibson, ed., Constitutional Aspects of Water Management (University of Manitoba:
Agassiz Centre, Research Report No. 2, 1968); S. Stein, Environmental Control (1971),
14 Canadian Public Administration 129 [hereinafter Stein, Environmental Control];
Systems Research Group, The Role of Canadian Constitutional Law As a Framework for
Environmental Control Policy (1970) [hereinafter S.R.G., Environmental Control].
8The interrelationship between social and economic problems that was discussed
supra, makes it difficult to designate any particular head of power as either a social or
economic head. Nevertheless, I think there is some validity in approaching the problem
and the federal heads of power from these two perspectives and the peace, order and
good government criminal law powers seem to fall into the social, well-being category.
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a role to play but the precise limits of each role is not apparent from a reading
of the constitution. The advantage of such a loose, vaguely defined framework
is that it leaves governments free to negotiate a solution in light of the special
difficulties of regulating such a complex, and diverse problem. The advantage
is only realized, however, if both governments are willing to deal with the
problem in a meaningful way. It soon becomes a disadvantage if either govern-
ment refuses to participate in finding a solution. Because neither government
is obviously responsible for inaction, each can blame the other under the
banner: "We'd love to help but constitutionally our hands are tied. The other
level of government has jurisdiction over the problem." When the argument
is used by the provinces in conjunction with their lack of resources it can
become a fairly convincing one. What must be done therefore, is to delineate
clearly constitutional responsibility between the two governments.
Finally, one more point should be kept in mind. Federal powers, especially
under the peace order and good government head, have gradually been
extended. Perhaps this springs from the recognition that most problems in
some way concern all Canadians and therefore require some involvement from
the federal government. Whatever the reason federal powers have recently
been undergoing a rather dramatic resurgence. This growth has not necessarily
been at the expense of the provincial governments, however. Their powers
have been growing too-although to a lesser extent. The court, recognizing a
need for government involvement in a multitude of new areas, has tended to
uphold government legislation unless it clearly infringes on the legislative power
of the other level of government. Thus, as federal involvement has increased,
its constitutional powers have expanded and the justification for greater federal
involvement has grown.
Although the British North America Act (BNA Act) 9 makes no specific
reference to environmental control, analogous issues suggest that both the
federal and provincial governments share legislative10 jurisdiction over the
problem. However, because pollution primarily affects pr6perty rights, the
provincial governments must be regarded as having primary legislative respon-
sibility. 1 But pollution was not an issue in 1867 when the BNA Act was enacted
and consequently the Constitution really has very little to tell us about who
should deal with the issue. That can only be determined by a close analysis
of the problem and, as we have shown, such an analysis suggests that the federal
government should assume a far more active and positive role in environmental
control. However, that role must be justified in terms of the existing constitu-
tional division of powers. Unless we can demonstrate that there is ample
justification and that the federal government can no longer avoid responsibility
for the problem by denying jurisdiction, then our demand for a greater federal
role will fall on deaf ears.
9The British North America Act, 1867, 30 and 31 Victoria c. 3 as amended.
lOFor a discussion of the proprietary rights in the environment see: Gibson, Constitu-
tional Context, supra, note 4 at 72-81; Stein, Environmental Control, supra, note 7 at
140-41; and Laskin, "Jurisdictional Framework", supra, note 7.
lIBritish North America Act, 1867, 30 and 31 Victoria c. 3, as amended s. 92(13).
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Federal Legislative Powers
The heads of power under the BNA Act that may support federal
involvement in the environmental control field fall neatly into two distinct
categories-conceptual powers and functional powers.12 The first provides
for general federal competence to legislate over a broad range of important
activities, which by analogy include environmental quality; the second speci-
fically gives Parliament control over certain activities that are closely related
to pollution in the sense that they may be adversely affected by, or may in fact
contribute to the pollution problem. Included in the first category are the federal
power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada,13
criminal law,14 trade and commerce, 15 and taxing and spending powers.16 The
second group includes works and undertakings, 17 navigation and shipping' s and
sea coast and inland fishing,19 harbours and rivers and lake improvements.20
(1) The Conceptual Powers
(a) Peace, Order and Good Government: s. 91
The general federal legislative power has had a very stormy history.
Judicial interpretations of the section have fluctuated from expansive to
restrictive. Today, however, it seems to be undergoing a revival that may
eventually take it beyond its earliest, most expansive interpretations.
At first blush the introductory statement of section 91 of the BNA Act
seems to give the Federal Parliament wide legislative powers over a whole
range of activities. It provides that Parliament has the power ".... to make laws
for the Peace, Order and Good Government of Canada, in relation to all matters
not coming within the head of subjects of this Act assigned exclusively to the
Legislature of the Provinces ...-21 In Russell v. The Queen2 2 the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council adopted the apparent interpretation of the
section and upheld federal temperance legislation on the ground that it dealt
with public order and safety throughout the nation and did not fall within an
exclusive provincial power under "property and civil rights" or "all matters
of a merely local or private nature in the province." The federal general power,
therefore, was able to support legislation dealing with any matter not specifically
"within the province" if it was desirable to establish a uniform law throughout
the Dominion. This approach was very short lived. Only fourteen years after
12 The division of federal powers into conceptual and functional powers is discussed
in Lyon, Canadian Constitution, supra, note 7 at Chapter 10.
13British North America Act, 1867, 30 and 31 Victoria c. 3, as amended.
14Id., s. 91(27).
'5Id., s. 91(2).
161d., s. 91 (IA).
171d., s. 91(29) and s. 92(10).
181d., s. 91(10).
191d., s. 91(12).
201d., s. 108.
211d., s. 91.
22(1882), 7 A.C. 829.
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Russell was decided, the Privy Council in the Local Prohibition case,23 effec-
tively relegated the general power from its lofty position as the primary grant
enumerated heads in both section 91 and section 92. Lord Watson, however,
did not preclude federal initiative in all local or provincial matters; he left the
door ajar by speculating that certain of these matters, "might attain such
dimensions as to affect the body politic of the Dominion" and thus justify "the
Canadian Parliament in passing laws for their regulation or abolition in the
interest of the Dominion. '24 This approach was further restricted by Duff, J.
In Re the Board of Commerce Act.-5 In that case the learned judge stated:
[W]hile for the purpose of dealing with a matter of interest to the whole Dominion
in the sense of being a matter affecting or pertaining to the public order and good
government of the whole Dominion..., Parliament may legislate so long as its
enactments are of such a character that they do not deal with matters from a
provincial point of view within the specific classes of subjects enumerated in
section 92 (that is the first fifteen heads), it is not within its power under the
residuary clauses to enact legislation which from the provincial point of view falls
within any one of such classes.26
Duff J.'s interpretation suggests that impugned legislation would stand only
if it did not fall within any of the provincial enumerations and was national in
scope. On appeal to the Privy Council, Viscount Haldane stated that critical
emergency circumstances must exist before the general power could be used
to abrogate a provincial power enumerated under section 92.27
For the next twenty-five years the "emergency" doctrine dominated judicial
interpretation of the general powers.2 8 Thus, in Fort Frances Pulp and Power
Company v. Manitoba Free Press,29 the court, in a rare example of upholding
federal legislation, held:
In the event of war, when the national life may require for its preservation the
employment of very exceptional means, the provision of peace, order and good
government for the country as a whole may invoke effort on behalf of the whole
nation... 3o
Very few pieces of federal legislation could ever be supported under such a
restrictive test. For example, legislation to establish national conciliation
services in vital industries3 ' and to end the chaos in the marketing of wheat32
was held ultra vires.
23A..G. for Ontario v. A.-G. for Canada, [1896] A.C. 348.
241d., per Lord Watson at 361.
25In Re The Board of Commerce Act and The Combines and Fair Prices Act, (1920),
60 S.C.R. 456, 54 D.L.R. 254; rev'd [1922] A.C. 191.
26(1920), 60 S.C.R. 456 per Duff, J., at 511. Also quoted in A. Abel, What Peace
Order and Good Government? (1968), 7 U. of W. Ont. L. Rev. 1 at 12, n. 33 [hereinafter
Abel, What Peace].
27 [1922] 1 A.C. 191 at 200.
28For a good discussion of this era see B. Laskin, Peace Order and Good Government
Re-examined (1947), 25 Can. Bar Rev. at 1054.
29 [1923] A.C. 695.
301d., per Viscount Haldane at 703-04.
31 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
32The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434.
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The "emergency doctrine" has been effectively eliminated by a recent trend
of cases beginning with the A.-G. for Ontario v. Canada Temperance Feder-
ation.33 Viscount Simon stated:
The true test must be found in the real subject of the legislation; if it is such that
it goes beyond local or provincial concern or interests and must, from its inherent
nature, be a concern of the Dominion as a whole, then it will fall within the
competence of the Dominion Parliament as a matter affecting the peace, order
and good government of Canada though it may in another aspect touch on matters
specially reserved to the Provincial Legislature.34
The test does not require "that the problem dealt with be one of uniform and
universal interest through the length and breadth of the land,, 35 only that the
subject matter extend beyond provincial interest and concern the Dominion
as a whole. There is also authority that the court "ought not to examine too
closely the correctness of value judgments which Parliament has been forced
to make."3 6 In Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians v. A.-G. for
Canada37 Lord Wright argued that:
Very clear evidence that an emergency has not arisen, or that the emergency no
longer exists, is required to justify the judiciary, even though the question is one
of ultra vires, in overruling the decision of the Parliament of the Dominion that
exceptional measures were required or were still required.3S
Thus there is a tendency to assume that the legislation is valid unless there are
compelling reasons to the contrary. Relying on these two lines of argument the
courts have held that federal legislation dealing with aeronautics, 39 telecom-
munications,40 atomic energy4l and the beautification of the national capita14z
may all be supported under the general peace order and good government power.
More recently the court was prepared to rely on the general powers to
support a federal claim to mineral rights off the British Columbia coast.43
The Supreme Court reasoned that because the subject matter did not come
within the classes of subjects assigned to the provincial legislatures under
section 91, it "may, therefore, properly be regarded as a matter affecting Canada
generally and covered by the expression the peace order and good government
33 [1946] A.C. 193.
341d., per Viscount Simon at 203.
35See Abel, What Peace, supra, note 26 at 2.
36B. L. Strayer, Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1968) at 143.
37 [1947] A.C. 87.
381d., at 101-02.
39Johannesson v. West St. Paul, [1952] S.C.R. 292.
401n Re Regulation and Control of Radio Communication in Canada, [1932] 2 D.L.R.
81, [1932] A.C. 304.
41Pronto Uranium Mines Ltd. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board, [1956] O.R. 862,
5 D.L.R. (2d) 342 (Ont. H.C.).
42 Munro v. National Capital Commission, [1956] S.C.R. 666. See also Porter v.
The Queen, [1946] 1 Ex. C. R. 200.
43Reference Re Ownership of Off Shore Mineral Rights, [1967] S.C.R. 792.
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of Canada." 44 Any compunction the courts may have had about extending
federal power under the general head seems to be gone.
One particular case, the Pronto Uranium45 case, suggests that the courts
may have already gone beyond their earlier centralist position and therefore
deserves special attention. In that case McLennan, J. relied on Rand J.'s state-
ment in Ref. Re Validity of Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act:
It would be incompatable with the power of Parliament [for the provincial
government] to legislate in respect of the control of atomic energy for the peace,
order and good government of Canada if labour relations in the production of
that substance did not lie within the regulation of Parliament.46
Once the court says that Parliament has legislative competence to deal with a
particular matter it seems to follow that it also has legislative competence to
deal with related or associated activities. This statement recognizes the func-
tional interrelationship of different activities. If a government has control over
the primary activity, jurisdiction is extended to include secondary activities
that are closely related to it. Given the functional interrelationship of most
activities, including pollution control, it may be possible to bring all aspects of
pollution abatement under a uniform federal regulatory once the federal Parlia-
ment can establish jurisdiction over some part of the field.
One part of the problem that may support such an approach under the
peace order and good government power is public health. Reference was made
in the Margarine case to "... competent Dominion public health legislation
under the peace, order and good government clause of section 91"47 thus
suggesting that federal initiative to avert a public health crisis including regu-
latory measures would be intra vires. By establishing jurisdiction over the health
aspect of pollution, legislative control could then be extended under the Pronto
doctrine to include regulation of the economic aspects of pollution.
Clearly, the general power would provide an innovative and politically
courageous federal government with some compelling legal arguments to
support strong environmental protection legislation. The courts, in recent years,
have not hesitated to uphold important federal legislation under this head. The
rationale for this approach is not hard to find. Rather than relying exclusively
on a strict interpretation of the constitution and subsequent Privy Council
decisions which may have little relevance to the practicalities of problems
before it, the Supreme Court seems to be adopting a much more pragmatic,
realistic approach. If an important (not necessarily national) activity requires
a high degree of central, co-ordinated control, that is lacking at the provincial
level and there are sound reasons why the provinces could not properly assume
such control, then the court has been prepared to uphold the needed federal
441d. It should be noted, however, that this comment is obiter because the court
found that the territorial sea did not belong to British Columbia at the time of Confeder-
ation and that they had not since acquired it. For a good discussion of the case see I. Head,
The Canadian Offshore Mineral Reference (1968), 18 U. of T. LJ. at 131.
45Pronto Uranium Mines Ltd., supra, note 41.
46Reference Re Validity of Industrial Relations and Disputes Investment Act, [1955]
3 D.L.R. 721, per Rand, J., at 746-47.
47Reference Re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1
at 78, as quoted in Laskin, "Jurisdictional Framework", supra, note 7 at 218.
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legislation.48 The ramifications for this new approach in the environmental field
are far reaching indeed. Parliament, now finds itself in a very enviable bargain-
ing position. It can demand that the provinces co-operate and if they refuse,
can pass legislation that will impose solutions on them.
(b) Criminal Law Powers: s. 91 (27)
The scope of the federal criminal law power has never been defined by
the courts with any degree of precision. Several tests have been adduced by the
courts, but none are definitive. A useful starting point for this study is the Privy
Council's statement in Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. A.-G. for
Canada:49
'Criminal law' means 'the criminal law in its widest sense?... The power must
extend to legislation to make new crimes. Criminal law connotes only the quality of
such acts or omissions as are prohibited under appropriate penal provisions by
authority of the state. The criminal quality of an act cannot be discerned by
intention,-nor can it be discovered by reference to any standard but one: is the
act prohibited with penal consequences?... The domain of criminal jurisprudence
can only be ascertained by what acts at any particular period are declared by the
State to be crimes, and the only common nature they will be found to possess is
that they are prohibited by the State and that those who commit them are
punished.50
This loose test suggests two broad criteria: sufficient blameworthiness (as
defined by Parliament) and a general prohibitionsl (not regulation) by way
of sanctions.
) Blameworthiness
Parliament's power to define blameworthiness has been widely construed.
In the Reference Re Section 498 of The Criminal Code case52 Chief Justice Duff
stated:
... in enacting laws in relation to matters falling within the subject of criminal
law,... Parliament is not restricted by any rule limiting the acts declared to be
criminal acts to such as would appear in a court of law to be 'in their own nature"
48S. Stein, in An Opinion on the Constitutional Validity of the Proposed Canada
Water Act (1970), 28 U. of T. Fac. of Law Rev. 74 at 80 concludes that the "crucial
question of fact is whether or not the subject matters dealt with under the legislation in
question have truly reached a level of national interest and concern." The test of "national
concern" is far more difficult for the federal government to meet than one that I have
formulated.
49 [1931] A.C. 310 at
5Old., at 324 perLord Atkin (emphasis added). This passage is quoted in B. Laskin,
Canadian Constitutional Law (3rd ed. Toronto: Carswells, 1966) at 850 [hereinafter
Laskin, Constitutional Law], and Varcoe, The Constitution of Canada (Toronto, Carswells,
1965) at 125-261 [hereinafter Varcoe, Constitution of Canada].
51H. Landis, in an article entitled, Legal Controls of Pollution in the Great Lakes
Bash (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev. 66 elaborates on the prohibitory aspect at 122 where he
states: "The essence of the criminal law is prohibition of a general nature, not control and
regulation of an individual case and this is the main advantage of the exercise of this
jurisdiction." [hereinafter Landis, Legal Controls].
52 [1936] S.C.R. 363; [1937] A.C. 368.
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criminal. The jurisdiction in relation to the criminal law is plenary, and enactments
passed within the scope of that jurisdiction are not subject to review by the courts.5 3
Lord Atkin, defined the federal criminal law power in a like manner:
There is no other criteria of 'wrongness' other than the intention of the legislature
in the public interest to prohibit the act or omission made criminal. 4
However broadly the courts have interpreted the blameworthiness element it
would be a mistake to think that there are not some limits to this aspect of the
federal power. In this regard, it seems that there are two discernible limiting
principles. One focuses on the problem of federal legislative encroachment
into provincial territory, the other becomes embroiled in the difficult task of
drawing distinctions between social and economic problems.
The first principle confines federal criminal law to legislation that is in
"pith and substance" a criminal matter or that complements legislation sup-
ported under one of the other federal heads of power. Thus the criminal law
power may, on its own, support federal legislation 55 or it may be used to affix
criminal sanctions to other competent federal legislation.56 In Board of
Commerce Lord Haldane perceived a distinction between subjects which, by
their very nature, belong to the realm of criminal jurisprudence and those
subjects that do not. A general law making incest a crime, he reasoned, would
fall naturally into the criminal law category. As G. P. Browne noted,
"Lord Haldane presumed the existence of an a priori 'domain of criminal
jurisdiction': because 'criminal laws' have an 'essential character,' there must
be predetermined limits to the federal parliament's sphere of legislative
authority." 57 Lord Haldane relied on this formula to strike down federal legis-
lation in Toronto Electric Commission v. Snider58
The penalities for breach of the [federal] restrictions did not render the statute
the less an interference with civil rights in its pith and substance. The Act is not
one which aims at making striking, generally, a new crime.59
Presumably if the purpose of the Act had been to make striking a crime, then
it could have been upheld under section 91 (27) in the same way that a statute
making incest a crime could be upheld. Less than ten years later Lord Atkin
in the Proprietary Articles case rejected such a "definition" as being too difficult
to apply.60 The last vestiges of Lord Haldane's attempted distinction were swept
away by Chief Justice Kerwin in the Lords Day Alliance Case: "In constitu-
tional matters there is no general area of criminal law and in every case the
53 Id., at 366.
54A.-G. for British Columbia v. A.-G. for Canada, [1937] A.C. 368, [1937] 1 D.L.R.
688 as quoted in Laskin, Constitutional Law, supra, note 50 at 850.
55Such as s. 165 of The Criminal Code which deals with public nuisance.
56See, for example s. 19 of the Arctic Waters Pollution Act, R.S.C. 1970, supp't
#1, c. 2.
57G. Browne, The Judicial Committee and the British North America Act (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1967) at 100. [hereinafter Browne, Judicial Committee].
58 [1925] A.C. 396.
591d., at 408.
6OProprietary Articles Trade Assoc. v. A.-G. for Canada, [1931] A.C. 310.
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pith and substance of the legislation must be looked at." 61 Today, subject matters
that have an "essential character" of criminality about them are confined
generally to the criminal code.
Developing criteria regarding the encroachment aspect of the criminal
law power has not been easy. Those used by the courts--"pith and substance",
"truth and substance" and "colourable" have been less than satisfactory. One
of the best attempts to lay down a general rule was made by Lord Atkin in
A.-G. for British Columbia v. A.-G. for Canada:62
... Parliament shall not in the guise of enacting criminal legislation in truth and
in substance encroach on any of the classes of subjects enumerated in section 92.
It is no objection that it does in fact affect them. If a genuine to amend the criminal
law, it may obviously affect previously existing civil rights. The object of an
amendment of the criminal law as a rule is to deprive the citizen of the right to do
that which apart from the amendment, he could lawfully do.63
Some degree of interference is an obvious consequence of enacting any criminal
legislation. Lord Atkin draws the line between constitutional and unconstitu-
tional interferences between federal legislation that "affects" provincial powers
and legislation that encroaches on provincial powers. The former is intra vires,
the latter is not: a rather tenuous distinction, to say the least! Whether the
court was prepared to phrase the interference in terms of an affect or an en-
croachment, hinged on whether or not the court felt the attacked legislation
could be supported under some other federal head of power. Legislation that
could not was quickly thrown out by the courts. For example, the Privy
Council adopted this line of reasoning to defeat federal legislation in the
Reciprocal Insurers Case:64
The Parliament of Canada cannot by purporting to create legal sanctions under
s. 91 (head 27) appropriate to itself exclusively a field of jurisdiction in which,
apart from such a procedure, it could exert no legal authority, and that if, when
examined as a whole, legislation in form criminal is found, in aspects and for
purposes exclusively within the provincial sphere, to deal with matters committed
to the Provinces, it cannot be upheld as valid.65
The legislation under attack in the Proprietary Articles Trade Association case
could be supported on some other ground and therefore was valid. Although
the legislation in both cases dealt with similar problems and although the Privy
Council reached a different decision in each case, this did not indicate incon-
sistency in the application of the criminal law power; rather, it suggested a
defect in the way in which the court analysed the problem in light of other
federal heads of power.66 If the legislation could be upheld under another head
61Lord's Day Alliance of Canada v. A.-G. for British Columbia (1959), 19 D.L.R.
(2d) 97, [1959] S.C.R. 497 at 102, 503.
62 [1937] A.C. 368. See also A.-G. for British Columbia v. Smith, [1967] S.C.R. 702.
63 Id., per Lord Atkin at 375-76.
64A.-G. for Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] A.C. 328.
65Id., per Duff, J. at 342. Although similar "regulatory" legislation involving the
Combines Investigation Act was permitted to stand. See Proprietary Articles Trade Asso-
ciation v.A.-G.for Canada [1931] A.C. 310, [1931] 2 D.L.R. 1.
66Here it is interesting to note Browne's comment that wherever there was a conflict
between the criminal law and the trade and commerce power, the ambit of s. 91(27) was
restricted. Browne, Judicial Committee, supra, note 57 at 105-06.
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of power there was no question that Parliament could enforce the legislation
through criminal sanction validly enacted pursuant to section 91(27). If it
could not, the criminal powers could not be used to save it.
The second principle used to block out the limits of the criminal law
power relates to the proper subject matter of the criminal law. The groundwork
for this principle was laid by Mr. Justice Rand in the Margarine Reference
case.67 Rand J., in deciding that federal legislation prohibiting the manufacture
and sale of margarine even when confined to a single province was invalid,
suggested that "the ordinary though not exclusive ends served by [the criminal
power]" include "public peace, order, security, health, morality. '68 The court
went on to find that the criminal prohibition in the case was not related to
health (the government admitted that margarine did not present a danger to
health), but dealt with an economic object. Because the ends were not the proper
subject matter of the criminal law, it followed that the legislation was invalid.
The Standard Sausage case, 69 decided 15 years before the Margarine Reference
case, mitigates against some of the harshness of Rand J.'s reasoning by uphold-
ing Dominion legislation although some of the prohibited substances were
considered harmless. We can only conclude from this decision that either the
courts are most reluctant to substitute their opinion for Parliament's regarding
a health danger or they recognize that the criminal law has a legitimate role
to play in the economic sphere.70
By focussing on the public health aspect of pollution, the criminal law
power may support a variety of different Federal anti-pollution laws. There
was no doubt in Professor Laskin's mind that "If there were any crisis of public
health, whether arising from pollution of water or otherwise, Parliament could
certainly deal with it."'71 This proposition seems to be supported by two deci-
sions. In the first, Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. A.-G. for Quebec,72
the Supreme Court suggested that if federal legislation had as its express object
the elimination of substances which had "some evil or injurious or undesirable
effect upon the public" the legislation could reside within an aspect of the
criminal law power.73 Support for this position may also be found in the courts'
decision to uphold the federal Food and Drugs Act which established standards
of food purity and took other measures to prevent food adulteration.74
(ii) Prohibition versus Regulation
In addition to focusing on some kind of blameworthy conduct, the Privy
67Reference Re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1.
681d., at 50.
69Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee, [1934] 1 D.L.R. 706.
7OLaskin, Constitutional Law, supra, note 50 at 851.
71Laskin, "Constitutional Framework", supra, note 7 at 218.
7211949] S.C.R. 1 at 50, [1931] A.C. 179 (P.C.).
73It would be wrong, however, to rely too heavily on this dicta. Generally the courts
have not upheld federal marketing legislation. In the Federation of Agriculture case,
although the federal legislation was protective in nature and had the support of the
Federation, it was struck down in the basis that it directly affected the civil rights of
individuals in relation to trade within a province. Id., at 196.
74Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee, supra, note 69.
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Council also required in the Proprietary Articles Trade Association case that
a criminal law be prohibitory rather than regulatory. Criminal sanctions
designed to prohibit certain wrongful conduct are constitutional, whereas
sanctions used to regulate conduct are not. Needless to say, the distinction is a
fine one. It seems to depend on the way in which we look at a problem. From
the broader perspective a criminal sanction may very well be thought to regulate;
however, from a narrower point of view the law may prohibit a certain aspect
of an individual's overall conduct. For example, a law against discharging a
substance with more than x parts/million of Y substance is regulatory in the
sense that it doesn't prohibit an activity, nor does it make it an offence to
discharge lesser amounts of substance. Looked at in terms of a whole manu-
facturing process, the law regulates the way in which a product is manufactured
to the extent that certain activities which are likely to contravene the law are
forbidden and others are not; but it does not prohibit manufacturing. However,
if we focus on the narrower issue of effluent and emission quality, certain kinds
of effluents are prohibited, others are not. Discharges above a standard are not
merely regulated, they are absolutely forbidden. Finally, it should be noted that
the Supreme Court in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada v. The Queen
was not impressed with the company's argument that a prohibition order enjoin-
ing further illegal combinations was invalid because the criminal law powers
refers only to the punishment and not the prevention of crimes. 75 In upholding
Parliament's right to prevent crimes, the court went on to say that merely
because similar acts are also punished under the criminal code does not preclude
further federal action under its criminal powers. 76
What are the prospects for a stronger federal anti-pollution role under
the criminal law powers? Most commentators agree that this power, combined
with the general power, provide the federal government with a very convincing
argument for comprehensive, all encompassing environmental protection
legislation.77 I would be more skeptical. The criminal law power is not that
broad. It certainly will not support comprehensive legislation on its own unless
that legislation defines pollution specifically as a crime and confines remedial
measures to prohibitions of certain conduct. That kind of legislation may be
appropriate in some situations for some types of pollution, but it will be grossly
75 [1956] S.C.R. 303 at 308. Mr. Justice Rand, in a concurring opinion, opened the
door for a more innovative federal role. "It is accepted that head 27 of s. 91 of the
Confederation Statute is to be interpreted in the widest sense, but that the breadth of scope
contemplates neither a static catalogue of offences nor order of sanctions. The evolving
and transforming types and patterns of social and economic activities are constantly
calling for new penal controls and limitations and that new modes of enforcement and
punishment adopted to the changing conditions are not to be taken as being equally
within the ambit of parliamentary power is, in my opinion, not seriously arguable."
Quoted in E.S. Binavince, Economic Growth Through Constitutional Safeguards. The
Canadian Experience (1971), 17 McGill Law Journal 189, [hereinafter Binavince,
Economic Growth].
761t would appear, therefore, that a potential polluter could not escape liability under
a federal criminal sanction by arguing that the section 165 of the criminal code (common
nuisance) and section 165A (Bill C-189, 1970 creating an offence for the discharge of
noxious matter into interprovincial waters) have precluded further activity in this area.
77See for example, Stein, supra, note 48 and Stamp, "Constitutional Problems of
Interprovincial Rivers", supra, note 7.
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inadequate if what is needed is a multi-levelled attack on the problem that
employs various regulatory and remedial tools. The criminal law power role
in a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme is primarily complementary.
It will support criminal law sanctions within the scheme but not the scheme
itself.
(c) Federal Taxing Power: s. 91(3)
Section 91(3) confers authority on Parliament to raise money "by any
Mode or System of Taxation". Taxes may be used in two different ways in the
environmental field to raise revenue and to help influence individual behaviour.
The two roles are very closely linked and in fact it is often impossible to dis-
tinguish one from the other.
Whatever role we choose for the taxing power, many hurdles must be
overcome before the court will uphold it. The mere use of the word "tax" in a
statute does not necessarily mean that a legal tax is in fact being levied. As we
have seen before, federal legislation must not be a "colourable" attempt to
trench on provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights. Two cases amply
illustrate the vulnerability of federal taxing legislation to this kind of an attack.
First, in In Re The Insurance Act of Canada,78 the Privy Council held that a
federal attempt to intermeddle with the conduct of insurance business under
the guise of legislation imposing Dominion taxation would be struck down.
The licensing feature of the Act invaded a field of exclusive Provincial authority,
insurance, and therefore the whole Act fell.79 The second case involved a federal
attempt under the Employment and Social Insurance Act of 1935 to provide a
comprehensive scheme of unemployment insurance.8 0 The Privy Council
rejected the federal government's argument that the obligations imposed by the
Act on employers and employees were a form of tax and decided that in pith
and substance the Act was an insurance Act affecting the civil rights of employers
and employees and was accordingly within the exclusive competence of the
provincial legislation. As the Privy Council had warned l taxes imposed by the
federal government for "provincial purposes" could not stand. Thus we have a
further affirmation by the courts of the principle that a particular head of power
such as taxing cannot be used to justify an invasion into the provincial legisla-
tive sphere nor can they be linked with such an invasion. On its own, the taxing
power may not be able to support a fairly limited range of anti-pollution
legislation. It certainly could not be the sole justification for a comprehensive
regulatory scheme. It could, however, be used to extend the Canadian Income
Tax Act to provide exemptions, tax holidays, and accelerated depreciation of
capital assets for all types of pollution abatement equipment.82 Similarly, the
Act could be amended to eliminate, or at least reduce the tax advantages
presently enjoyed by the primary extractive industries and thus encourage more
78 [1932] A.C. 41 (P.C.).
791d., at 52.
80A..G. for Canada v. A.-G. for Ontario, [1937] A.C. 355 (P.C.).
81Caron v. The King, [1924] A.C. 999 (P.C.).
82 provision is presently made for certain classes of property acquired for purposes
of water pollution prevention or abatement. The Canadian Income Tax Act, R.S.C.
1970 c. I-S, Schedule B-Capital Cost Allowances, Class 24.
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recycling.83 Or, the federal government could follow Ontario's example8 4 and
refund the federal sales tax paid on pollution abatement equipment.
One way to avoid judicial interference is to rationalize a regulatory scheme
in terms of some other head of power and merely use the taxing powers to
justify the taxing aspects of an already legal scheme. Thus the taxing aspect
would be complementary rather than primary. As part of an integrated scheme
taxes could be levied on effluent quality as an effluent charge. Leaving aside
the problem of how one would determine the appropriate charge, this would
have the obvious advantage of helping to guarantee the economic viability of
the program and determining behaviour patterns. Polluters would automatically
reduce their effluent to the point where money spent on more pollution abate-
ment equipment would no longer result in a net saving through reduced effluent
charges. New developments in technology that reduced the cost of emitting
cleaner water or air would immediately be adopted by industry because expenses
incurred to install these new devices would be more than recouped through
further reductions in the amount of tax paid. The money raised through this
scheme would not necessarily cover the costs of administering the whole
regulatory program for it is unlikely and even undesirable that the taxes should
be levied with only this end in mind. However, funds would be raised this way
and they could be used to help cover administration, research and development
costs.
As appealing as this tax scheme may seem, it may face judicial opposition
on constitutional grounds. First, a federal tax on such a novel item as effluent
quality rather than on normal things such as persons, goods or transactions, may
be deemed to be a penalty. As a penalty, it may still be supported under the
criminal law power, but runs the further risk of being struck down as regulatory
rather than prohibitory. Secondly, an effluent tax used to administrative costs
would have to meet all the indicia of taxation as set out by the court in the
Tree Fruit case.85 In that case, a provincial administrative agency attempted to
defray its operating costs by imposing levies on the marketing of certain com-
modities. Duff J. held that the levies were taxes since they were enforceable by
law, imposed under the authority of the legislature, imposed by a public body
and made for a public purpose.8 6 The similarities between an effluent charge
and a levy are obvious. Although the charge also influences behaviour, if the
revenue is used for administration purposes, it would seem to meet all four
criteria. Public purpose need not be solely for the direct support of the govern-
ment; it would also include government designed regulatory programs. 87
83The practice of implementing social and economic policy through taxation has
been criticized by the Carter Report as creating distortions in the economy. If, however,
we continue to use our Income Tax Act in this manner it has great potential as a device
for encouraging more investment in pollution abatement equipment.
84Pollution Abatement Incentive Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 352.
SsLawson v. Interior Tree, Fruit & Vegetable Committee, [1931] S.C.R. 357, [1931]
2 D.L.R. 193.
861d. The case is discussed in Laskin, Constitutional Law, supra, note 50 at 669.
A similar holding was also made in Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board,
[1938] A.C. 708, [1938] 4 D.L.R. 81.
87See S.R.G., Environmental Control, supra, note 7, for a good discussion of these
points.
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Like the criminal powers the taxing powers may be used either on its own
to justify specific tax measures to alleviate pollution, or in conjunction with
other federal powers to legitimize the taxing aspects of a comprehensive pollu-
tion abatement scheme. The real effectiveness of both powers, lies in their
complementary rather than primary role.
(d) The FederalSpending Power
A related power that may be used by Parliament to control pollution is the
federal spending power.88 Under this power, Parliament can attach conditions
to the terms on which it disposes of its real and other property. When disposing
of public funds, for example, Parliament can use conditional grants in aid to
regulate various types of activity where it does not have clear jurisdiction.
Professor La Forest, commenting on the extent of this power, notes that:
In addition to the subsidies guaranteed under various constitutional instruments,
the federal parliament pays the provinces vast subsidies under authority of federal
statutes. Again it makes extensive grants to individuals, organizations, and public
authorities as well as to the provinces, not only for schemes falling under other
federal heads of power, but for many ordinarily governed by provincial law.
By attaching conditions to such grants, it can powerfully influence the scope and
direction of such schemes.8 9
The constitutionality of the spending power was reviewed in the Unem-
ployment Insurance case 90 and although the court struck down the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act, it did so on the basis that the Act dealt with the civil rights
of the labour force in each province, not because the spending power and
conditional grants established under it were an exercise in jurisdiction over
public property, beyond the capacity of Parliament. Nevertheless, Parliament
may not directly invade the realm of provincial authority under the guise of its
spending power. The Privy Council, upholding a Supreme Court decision 91 held:
That the Dominion may impose taxation for the purpose of creating a fund for
special purposes and may apply that fund for making contributions in the public
interest to individuals, corporations or public authorities, could not as a general
proposition be denied.... If on the true view of the legislation it is found that
in reality, in pith and substance the legislation invades civil rights within the
Province, or in respect of other classes of subjects otherwise encroaches upon the
provincial field, the legislation will be invalid. To hold otherwise would provide
the Dominion an easy passage into Provincial domain. 92
Despite this strong warning to Parliament, it has not precluded co-operative
arrangements with the provinces which have had a pronounced effect on provin-
cial decision-making.
The scope of this federal power is as broad as the imagination of federal
administrators. Notwithstanding the usual caveat regarding federal encroach-
S8British North America Act, 1867, 20 and 31 Victoria, c. 3 as amended. "The Public
Debt and Property."
89G. V. La Forest, Natural Resources and Public Property Under the Canadian
Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969) at 136-37 [hereinafter La Forest,
Natural Resources].
90A.-G. for Canada v. A.-G. for Ontario, [1936] S.C.R. 427.
91Reference Re Employment & Social Insurance Act, [1936] S.C.R. 427.
92 [1937] A.C. 355 at 366-67.
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ment, various conditions could be attached to federal subsidies that would
guarantee a high degree of federal influence on the environmental protection
policies of those provinces that accepted the money. If a province is free not to
participate, it cannot complain as easily about federal encroachment. This would
be one easy way of establishing federal abatement standards in all the parti-
cipating provinces.
(e) The Trade and Commerce Power: s. 91(2)
If there is one stumbling block that may stop the federal government
from developing a comprehensive regulatory scheme it is the trade and com-
merce power. The pollution problem, as we argued earlier, has an important
economic dimension which seems to fall naturally within the purview of the
federal government. One might have expected that the primary source of federal
regulatory power in the commerce sphere would flow from the trade and com-
merce power, but unfortunately this power has been given a very restrictive
interpretation by the Privy Council.
The power was first considered in Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons,93
a case that examined the validity of an Ontario statute that purported to provide
uniform conditions for all insurance contracts related to property and civil
rights in the province. Sir Montague Smith, delivering the judgment of the
Judicial Committee asserted:
Construing therefore the words 'regulation of trade and commerce' .... They
would include political arrangements in regard to trade requiring the sanction of
parliament, regulation of trade in matters of interprovincial concern, and it may be
that they would include general regulation of trade affecting the whole Dominion.94
Taking their cue from this interpretation of the trade and commerce power,
later courts have held that the power should be restricted "in order to afford
scope for powers which are given exclusively to the provincial legislator" 95
because if the words were taken in their widest sense they would authorize
federal legislation that would "seriously encroach upon the local autonomy
of the province." 96 In the Board of Commerce case, 97 Lord Haldane went so
far to restrict the trade and commerce power that Professor McWhinney com-
mented that the "power was available only to 'aid' the Dominion in an excep-
tional situation to exercise the powers conferred by the general language of
section 91, that where no power was possessed by the Dominion Parliament
independently of the trade and commerce section, the trade and commerce
section would not operate." 98 Mr. Justice Anglin recognized the depths to
which their power had been relegated in The King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator
Co.99 when he said that the power had been "denied all efficacy as an independ-
ent enumerative head of Dominion legislative jurisdiction." Generally Federal
03 (1881), 7 A.C. 96.
941d., at 112.
95Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 A.C. 575 at 581.
96CIty of Montreal v. Montreal Street Railway, [1912] A.C. 333 at 334.
971n Re The Board of Commerce Act and the Combines and Fair Prices Act, 1919,
[1922] A.C. 191.
98E. MeWhinney, The Canadian Constitution Under the Impact of Judicial Review.
99 [19251 S.C.R. 474 at 442 as quoted in Id.
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regulation for international and interprovincial trade remained,100 but Parlia-
ment could not legislate for the regulation of a particular trade or business, 101
nor could the regulation relate to any intraprovincial aspect of the trade 02
unless it was trade and commerce affecting "the whole Dominion of Canada."'
10 3
With the trade and commerce power, we see just how far judicial paranoia
over federal encroachment will take us. Judicial restrictions imposed on either
the criminal or taxing powers were mild in comparison to what the court has
done to trade and commerce. At least there, the courts were prepared to accept
that both heads of power could play a limited role in terms of supporting their
own federal legislation. Here, no such concessions were made. Trade and com-
merce may help extend federal legislation once it has been established under
another head such as peace, order and good government, but it will not support
its own legislation.
Two lines of argument may be used to remove some of the strictures of
these earlier decisions. The most interesting possibilities for a revived trade
and commerce power may come through an extension of the definition of
trade affecting the "whole Dominion of Canada". Recent decisions suggest
that the courts have not yet clearly defined the limits of this phrase,104 and
there is still some room for flexibility. Historically, one decision of the Privy
Council, John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton 105 attempted to set down some
guidelines in this matter. John Deere, a federally incorporated company,
successfully rebutted a shareholder's charge that it had not complied with
provincial regulations by arguing in part that the provincial legislation
violated federal powers over trade and commerce and hence was invalid. The
Board, in a surprisingly broad decision accepted the company's argument and
10OLawson v. Interior Tree, Fruit and Vegetable Committee, [1931] S.C.R. 357,
[19311 2 D.L.R. 193; Citizen Insurance Co. v. Parson (1882), 7 A.C. 96; Gold Seal Ltd. v.
Dominion Express (1921), 62 S.C.R. 424, 435, and e56-58. It was quite clear, however,
that the legislation could not relate to any aspect of intraprovincial trade: A.-G. for British
Columbia v. A.-G. for Canada, [1937] A.C. 377. As prospective markets for many
products were impossible to define at the time potential legislation would be passed,
federal involvement in this area was seriously curtailed. See also, The King v. Eastern
Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434.
101Varcoe, Constitution of Canada, supra, note 50 at 85 cites a number of cases to
support this proposition.
102Duff, CJ.'s statement in Re Natural Products Marketing Act, [1936] S.C.R. 398;
aff'd [1937] A.C. 377 at 412 (a case dealing with legislation that purported to regulate
the marketing of natural products) is strong support for this point.
"The enactments in question, therefore, in so far as they relate to matters which
are in substance local and provincial are beyond the jurisdiction of Parliament.
Parliament cannot acquire jurisdiction to deal in the sweeping way in which these
enactments operate with such local and provincial matters by legislating at the
same time respecting external and interprovincial trade and committing the regu-
lation of trade which is exclusively local to the same authority."
103There is a thread of support for this proposition beginning with Citizen Insurance
Co. v. Parson (1882), 7 A.C. 96, and reinforced in Russell v. The Queen (1882), 7 A.C.
829; Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 A.C. 575; and Toronto Electric Commission v.
Snider, [1925] A.C. 396.
104See A. Smith, The Commerce Power in Canada and the United States (1963),
at 77. Noted in Binavince, Economic Growth, supra, note 75 at 196.
105 [19151 AC. 330 (P.C.).
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supported Parliament's grant to such companies. However, there was a certain
degree of ambivalence in the decision. At one point in the decision Lord
Haldane boldly extended the trade and commerce power to enable Parliament
"to prescribe to what extent the powers of companies the objects of which
extend to the entire Dominion should be exercisable, and what limitation
should be placed to such powers", 106 while at a later point he seemed to
retract or at least qualify this statement to the extent that these "powers can
be exercised in contravention of the laws of the Province restricting the rights
of the public in the province generally."107 One commentator has discounted
the apparent broad scope of this decision for two reasons.1 08 First it was
decided at a time (1915) when federal leadership in western Canada was
extremely strong, unlike the present situation. And secondly, subsequent
decisions have amply illustrated, that John Deere was, if anything, the excep-
tion that proves the rule. However, today when it is becoming more and more
essential that the federal government be given sufficient powers to co-ordinate
an effective anti-pollution and resource development program, the courts
might be prepared to accept their earlier decision to help justify a stronger
federal role.
The recent decision in the Farm Products Marketing'0 9 case suggests a
second way in which the courts may be willing to permit a greater federal
regulatory role under the trade and commerce head, namely, by extending
the definition of international and interprovincial trade to include trading
activities that have an extraprovincial aspect to them. Mr. Justice Rand stated
that new rule as follows:
That demarcation must observe this rule, that if in a trade activity, including
manufacture or production, there is involved a matter of extraprovincial interest
or concern its regulation thereafter in the aspect of trade is by that fact put beyond
Provincial powers.1 10
The crucial point here is the definition to be given to "extraprovincial interest
or concern". Both Mr. Justice Locke's "flow theory" ' and Mr. Justice Kerwin's
decision in the same case, give the federal Parliament some reason to be
optimistic here. Kerwin, for example, seemed to be prepared to come down
on the side of federal legislation because "[lt is, I think, impossible to fix any
minimum proportion of such last mentioned sales or intended sales as deter-
mining the jurisdiction of Parliament."112 The flow theory also suggests that
as long as there is some (no matter how small) extra provincial interest,
regulation is beyond provincial powers and once an interprovincial aspect is
established, Parliament can then rely on Duffs assertion in The Natural
Products Marketing case that "the regulation of trade and commerce . . .
embrace[s] the regulation of external trade and regulation of interprovincial
trade and such ancillary legislation as may be necessarily incidental to the
1061d., at 340.
1071d., at 341.
108Binavince, Economic Growth, supra, note 75 at 197-98.
lO9Reference Re the Farm Products Marketing Act, [1957] S.C.R. 198.
110d., per Rand, L at 210.
lld., at 231.
1121d.
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exercise of such powers."'13 Although such legislation also affects property
and civil rights in the province, it will still be upheld under the trade and
commerce power.
The picture as far as Parliament is concerned, may not be quite as bleak
as it once was. Nevertheless, it seems clear that although the power is
undergoing some judicial revision it would still be premature for Parliament
to rely on it too heavily for environmental protection purposes.
(f) Conclusion
Before going on to an analysis of the functional federal powers, it would
be useful to stop and comment briefly on two important characteristics of the
conceptual power. First, judicial interpretation seems to have distorted any
optimal role that these powers might have played. Because of the nature of
pollution and the makeup of our federal system, Parliament's main concern
in the environmental protection field is primarily with the economic aspect
and, to a lesser extent, the social aspects of the problem when they reach
interprovincial proportions. With regard to the social part, there is ample
federal regulatory authority under the criminal law power and, as judicial
interpretation expands the head, under the peace, order and good government
power. Regulatory powers to deal with the economic part of the problem
however, have been sadly lacking. Without any real prospect of a significant
expansion of federal authority under the trade and commerce power, Parlia-
ment, if it wishes to regulate the economic part, is forced to look for its
authority under regulatory heads that are designed to deal with the social aspect
of pollution. There is some doubt whether or not the criminal power may be
extended into this area. First, there is dicta to suggest that the role of the
criminal law power is social well-being rather than economic, and secondly,
whatever its role, it is complementary rather than primary. It may be used to
prohibit a particular activity, but except for a few clear-cut criminal code
type situations, this will have to be done in conjunction with a broader
regulatory scheme that is justified on some head other than criminal power.
Similarly, the federal taxing and spending powers would not support primary
federal activity in the economic sphere.
Parliament is left with only one possible head of power to fulfill its
economic "obligations" in the pollution control field, the peace, order and
good government power. Recent cases have expanded this power consider-
ably until today it has become the primary federal power for both social and
economic regulation. Thus, more federal involvement in the economic aspects
of pollution must be justified on the basis of this general power. It is difficult
to know whether judicial distortion of the respective roles for trade and
commerce and the general power is of anything more than tactical significance.
Secondly, and this point has already been alluded to on numerous
occasions, the criminal, taxing and spending powers have a rather limited role
to play on their own. Their strength lies in complementing a general regulatory
scheme by ensuring enforcement, influencing behaviour and contributing to
113 Reference Re Natural Products Marketing Act [1936] 3 D.L.R. 622, S.C.R. 398
at 410 (emphasis added).
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the economic viability of the scheme. By themselves, each head of power may
support important and essential federal anti-pollution legislation, but not a
comprehensive regulatory scheme.
(2) Functional Powers
In addition to the more general federal powers discussed above, Parlia-
ment may use its authority over certain specific activities to implement a
comprehensive scheme for environmental control. No one head of power by
itself in this category confers sufficient power on the central government to
support comprehensive legislation, but cumulatively they are a significant
weapon in the central government's arsenal of powers.
(a) Works and Undertakings: s. 91(29) and s. 92(10)
Section 91 (29) assigns to the federal authorities judisdiction over certain
classes of works and undertakings that are excepted from provincial judisdic-
tion in section 92(10). The excepted classes are:
92(10) (a) Lines of steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and other
Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or
others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the limits of the Province;
(b) Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any British or Foreign
Country:
(e) Such Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are before
or after their execution declared by the Parliament of Canada to be
for the advantage of two or more of the Provinces.
There are two elements within this broad grant of powers to Parliament.
First, Parliament has jurisdiction over interprovincial and international com-
munication, shipping and some modes of transportation; and secondly it may
acquire jurisdiction over intraprovincial works by the appropriate statutory
declaration.
(i) Extraprovincial classes
Several strong court decisions have guaranteed exclusive federal juris-
diction over the extraprovincial classes, and have effectively excluded any
specific provincial or local role. The court held in City of Toronto v. Bell
Telephone Co.114 that telephone company compliance with municipal by-laws
prior to entering city streets to install its facilities was not required. A similar
holding was made by the court in A.G. for Ontario v. Winner"15 where
an interprovincial bus line was not deemed to be subject to provincial regula-
tion of routes and fares. This decision, however, did not exclude provincial
highway laws of general application.
The courts have been very generous in defining the extent of federal
power in this area and in fact have made some significant intrusions into
fields that are normally reserved for the provinces. Federal jurisdiction over
international shipping for example has enabled Parliament to regulate the
114 [1905] A.C. 122.
115 [1954] A.C. 541.
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labour relations of persons engaged in all aspects of international shipping.116
Similarly, federal jurisdiction over Canada's largest telephone company, Bell
Canada, was extended to "all matters which are a vital part of an inter-
provincial undertaking as a going concern... within s. 91(29).117 Never-
theless, legislation must deal with the interprovincial or international nature
of the works or undertakings and does not extend to such undertakings as
hotels that are not part of the transportation system.112
(ii) Statutory Declaration
A statutory declaration that a work is for the general advantage of
Canada, or for the general advantage of two or more Provinces under section
92(10) (c) may be used by the federal government to enlarge its powers.
Although a declaration may be attacked as a colourable device to
appropriate powers outside federal legislative capacity, the courts have held
that ". . . Parliament is the sole judge of the advisability of making [a]
declaration as a matter of policy." 119 Provincial attacks against the broad use
of this power have focussed on the distinction between work and undertaking120
and argued that the declared activity is an undertaking rather than a work
and therefore not covered by section 92(10) (c). But again judicial inter-
pretation has not significantly circumscribed federal competence. Works and
undertakings are to be read disjunctively. 121 In Montreal v. Montreal Street
Railway'22 the Privy Council asserted that " . . . works are physical things
not services, while an undertaking is not a physical thing but "an arrange-
ment under which of course physical things are used."123 The declaratory
power under section 92(10) (c) may only apply to a "work", but the distinc-
tion between a work and an undertaking is vague and it is unlikely that a
"work" would be held to be an "undertaking" so as to make the declaration
inoperative. There is precedent for the declaratory power with respect to
grain elevators and warehouses,124 an international bridgel' s and a local
railway.126 Once the power has been used for one activity, it may be extended
ll 6lnvestigation Act and Its Applicability in Respect of Certain Employees of Eastern
Canada Stevedoring Co. Ltd., [1955] S.C.R. 526, [1955] 3 D.L.R. 721. See also Grand
Trunk Railway v. A.-G. for Canada, [1907] A.C. 65.
117 Commission du Salaire Minimum v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1966] S.C.R.
767. In this case the court excluded provincial minimum wage laws from applying to
Bell Canada.
118C.P.R. v. A.-G. forBritish Columbia, [1950] A.C. 122, [1950] 1 D.L.R. 721.
119Luscar Collieries Ltd. v. McDonald, [1925] S.C.R. 460 at 480, 484, [1925]
3 D.L.R. 225 at 239, 244. From this it follows that the exercise of a declaration of power
is not of itself reviewable by the Courts. See The Queen v. Thumbiert (1959) 20 D.L.R. 335.
120Laskin, Constitutional Law, supra, note 50 at 509. See also C.N.R. v. Trudeau,
[1962] S.C.R. 398.
121A.-G. for Ontario v. Israel Winner [1954] A.C. 541.
122 [1912] A.C. 333.
123Id., at 342.
124Canada Grain Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. G-16.
125Van Buren Bridge Co. v. Madawaska and A.-G. for New Brunswick (1958), 15
D.L.R. (2d) 763.
1 2 6Montreal v. Montreal Street Railway, [1912] A.C. 333.
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to similar activities by simply adding them to the designated activity. 127 Laskin
notes that the effect of a declaration is:
... to bring within federal authority not only the physical shell of the activity but
also the integrated activity carried on therein; in other words, the declaration
operates on the work in its functional character. 128
What constitutes an "integrated activity" is a question of fact for the court to
determine.
The potential of the declaratory power as a planning tool to control
potential works as well as pre-existing ones is limtied. Duff, I. defined the
object of the phrase "such works as ...are before or after their execution
declared by the Parliament of Canada.. ." to mean:
... not to enable the Dominion to take away jurisdiction from the provinces in
respect of a given class of potential works; works that is to say, which are not in
existence which may never come into existence and the execution of which is not
in contemplation; the purpose of the provision is rather to enable the Dominion
to assume control over specific existing works, or works the execution of which
is in contemplation. 129
Before Parliament can assume control over works, it would seem that they
would have to have reached at least the advanced planning stage. The inability
of the federal authorities to take control of the scheme before this point in
time may mean that the initial planning and policy decisions will be made
by the provinces. From the federal point of view the power is necessarily a
reactive one. Its whole purpose is to enable Parliament to respond to inter-
provincial and international problems that result from legitimate provincial
activity. If there is an interprovincial aspect to a proposed provincial project,
Parliament is better advised to negotiate some solution with the province
or immediately assume control under another head of power. Waiting until a
project has begun and then acting under the declaratory power is not a very
sensible way to deal with environmental problems.
The political problems of employing this tool to extend federal jurisdic-
tion may preclude its future use except in exceptional circumstances. 130 Unless
a particular problem reaches crisis proportions, it is unlikely that any provin-
cial government would tolerate federal intrusion by this technique. From the
provincial point of view, there has always been something distasteful about
such blatant federal intrusion into provincial jurisdiction. In fact, it may be
argued that the declaratory power has only developed because something was
needed to counterbalance the strictures placed on the trade and commerce
power. It was really only designed for exceptional circumstances and would
not have received such widespread use if it had not been the lack of a viable
alternative to the useless trade and commerce power. Now that peace, order
127Regina v. Chamney (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
128 Laskin, Constitutional Law, supra, note 50. Schwartz in an article entitled Fiat by
Declaration-s. 92 (10)(c) of the British North America Act (1960), 2 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 1 at 8 adds that if the courts apply the doctrine of "necessary incidental task"
they must build in a "remoteness factor".
129Luscar Collieries Ltd. v. McDonald, [1925] S.C.R. 460 at 476.
130See McDougal, "The Churchill Division: An Examination of its Implications"
(1971), unpublished paper.
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and good government has appeared on the scene again, the raison d'etre for
widespread use of the declaratory power is gone.
(b) Navigation and Shipping: s. 91(10)131
Federal power over navigation and shipping has undergone rather ambi-
valent treatment by the courts; at times it has been closely checked, at other
times it has enjoyed a fairly broad interpretation. The most reasonable
explanation for this development is that, in fact, the powers should be read
disjunctively as conferring jurisdiction over navigation and over shipping. 132
If we adopt this approach we see that the shipping aspect has, like trade and
commerce, suffered restrictions at the hands of property and civil rights.
(i) Navigation
The extent of the federal navigation power is summarized by Laskin in
the following passage:
The navigation power of Parliament extends inland to intraprovincial waters as
well as to interprovincial and international waters. It embraces, of course, protection
of public rights of navigation recognized by the common law, and also any exten-
sion or modification of such rights. The authority of Parliament in relation to
navigation is not affected by the fact that the title is in the Crown in right of a
Province.133
The result of this wide power is that every navigable body of water in Canada
is subject to exclusive federal control over all matters concerning navigation.
Where federal legislation exists,134 all provincial structures must conform to
it and where no such legislation exists, the provincial governments may not
obstruct or hinder navigation in any way.135 Federal legislation may sanction
and even direct the erection of any works or other operations that pertain to
navigability. 36 In fact federal power may even be invoked to create new
public rights of navigation where none previously existed over privately
owned river beds, although not through water on provincial Crown lands.137
There is, however, ".... provincial power to control or use waters in provincial
rivers and to develop or authorize development of water power within the
province so long as there is no prejudice to and there is compliance with
federal navigation authority."1 38
The extent to which the navigation power may be extended to regulate
activities which only incidentally affect navigation is far from clear. In assessing
the general scope of the power, the courts have said that it is to be construed
131Section 91(9) gives Parliament jurisdiction over "beacons, buoys, lighthouses..
as well.
132See, S.R.G., Environmental Control, supra, note 7 at 4.
133Laskin, "Jurisdictional Framework", supra, note 7 at 216.
134For example, Navigable Waters Protection Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-19.
135 Queddy River Driving Boom Co. v. Davidson (1883), 10 S.C.R. 222.
136Laskin, Constitutional Law, supra, note 50 at 526.
1371d., at 527-28. See also Fort George Lumber Co. v. G.T.P. Railway (1915), 24
D.L.R. 527.
138Laskin, "Jurisdictional Framework", supra, note 7 at 218.
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widely. 139 Notwithstanding some encouraging comments in these earlier cases,
the better view seems to be that the navigation power will only justify federal
jurisdiction over matters that are concerned primarily with navigation itself.140
Thus, Parliament is competent to pass legislation designed and intended for the
improvement of navigation or to provide facilities for navigation, but may have
difficulty legislating with respect to power production, 141 flood control and land
reclamation. The higher the degree of inter-relationship between these activities
and navigation, the more likely the federal legislation will be upheld. Where the
line is to be drawn, however, is still a matter of conjecture. In Reference Re
Waters and Water Power, Duff, J. suggested that federal jurisdiction over water
power works extending beyond provincial boundaries could be supported under
section 92(10) (a).142 If the works were merely local or provincial in nature
rather than interprovincial, Parliament may be forced to supplement its naviga-
tion power by relying on the declaratory power in section 92(10) (c) and
declaring the works for the general advantage of Canada.
(ii) Shipping
Federal authority to regulate shipping has never achieved the same degree
of prominence as the power over navigation. It seems to have suffered the same
fate as the trade and commerce power with the result that federal jurisdiction
is confined to interprovincial and international shipping. In the Queddy River
case, there was some indication that even if there was no explicit federal naviga-
tion power, one could be construed from the federal trade and commerce power
in much the same way as the U.S. navigation and shipping power developed.143
However, by linking shipping with trade and commerce, shipping seemed
doomed to suffer the same highly restrictive interpretation as trade and com-
merce. The result has been that federal jurisdiction in this field is confined
almost exclusively to the physical aspects of navigation with no regulatory
control over intraprovincial or local shipping. 44
The net effect of this power for pollution control purposes is still remark-
ably broad. 45 The federal government, for example, could legislate under sec-
tion 91 (10) to prohibit or limit deposits of debris, rubbish, sawdust, cinders
or any other deleterious substance. Parliament must, however, concern itself
with pollution abatement in an interprovincial or international shipping context;
it cannot deal with local or provincial water pollution problems under this head.
(c) Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries: s. 91(12)
Legislative jurisdiction over fisheries is divided between the two levels
of government. The Dominion government, under section 91(12), has extensive
139Queddy River Driving Boom Co. v. Davidson (1883), 10 S.C.R. 222; Montreal v.
Montreal Harbour Commission, [ 1926] A.C. 229.
140 Gibson, Constitutional Context, supra, note 7 at 83.
141Booth v. Lowery (1917), 54 S.C.R. 491 at 424.
142 [1929] S.C.R. 200, [1929] 2 D.L.R. 481.
143 Queddy River Driving Boom Co. v. Davidson (1883), 10 S.C.R. 222 per Strong, J.
at 235.
144See for example Canada Shipping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 7.
145Landis, Legal Control, supra, note 51 at 96.
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powers to control the regulatory aspects of fishing while provinces "... may
legislate on the proprietary aspects not only of provincially owned but also of
privately owned fisheries in the province by virtue of section 92(13).. ." 146
The cases have interpreted this division of powers to mean that the federal gov-
ernment may determine fishing seasons and public rights, and make conserva-
tion and anti-pollution regulations, while the provincial authorities control
private fishing rights and the processing and selling of fish once they are caught.
Many problems arise, however, when one puts this apparently simple distinction
to test in specific cases.
The best statement of the distinction was made by the Privy Council in
A.-G. for British Columbia v. A.-G. for Canada.147 The Board in affirming its
earlier interpretation of one aspect of the Fisheries case, 148 held that:
. .. [section 91(12)] does not confer on the Dominion any rights of property,
but that it does confer an exclusive right on the Dominion to make restrictions or
limitations by which public rights of fishing are controlled, and on this exclusive
right provincial legislation cannot trench. It recognized that the Province retains
a right to dispose of any fisheries the property in which the Province has a legal
title, so far as the mode of such disposal is consistent with the Dominion's right
of regulation, but it held that even in the case where proprietary rights remain
with the Province, the subject matter may be of such a character that the exclusive
power of the Dominion to legislate in regard to fisheries may restrict the free
exercise of provincial rights.149
This suggests that conflicts between the federal regulatory powers and provincial
powers over proprietary rights are to be resolved in favour of the former.
Nevertheless, as Laskin points out, there is a "strong current in the cases against
federal interference with proprietary rights, and hence Parliament may not
confer exclusive rights to fish (unless on federal Crown land) nor may it author-
ize use of private or provincial Crown land in connection with its otherwise
competent fishing regulations."' 5 0 Whatever the precise limits of each jurisdic-
tion, there seems to be little doubt that Parliament may legislate in respect to
the pollution of fishing waters provided the legislation has as its main purpose
the preservation and protection of fisheries. Thus, if prohibitions against the
deposit of deleterious substances to protect fishing, incidentally affected "prop-
erty and civil rights", such legislation could be upheld as valid federal law
making. Before one places too much faith in section 91(12) as an important
weapon in the federal constitutional arsenal over pollution, it may be that the
inherent restrictions of the power, namely, that it must deal with fisheries will
preclude it playing anything more than a very limited role. One commentator
has assessed the potential of this jurisdiction as a basis for significant federal
action as "almost nil".151
146La Forest, NaturalResources, supra, note 88 at 165.
147 [1914] A.C. 153, 15 D.L.R. 308.
148A..-G. for Canada v. A.-G. for Ontario et al., [1898] A.C. 700.
149 [1914] A.C. 153 per Viscount Haldane at 172. Also quoted in Laskin, Constitu-
tional Law, supra, note 50 at 543.
15OLaskin, "Jurisdictional Framework", supra, note 7 at 218. As authority for this
proposition Laskin cites A.-G. for Canada v. A.-G. for Quebec (1921), 1 A.C. 413.
151 McGrady, Water Resource, supra, note 7.
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No dispute arises over federal jurisdiction of tidal fishing waters because
the public has a right to fish these waters and thus there were never any property
rights attaching to them. As La Forest points out, "The public right to fish over-
rides the property right flowing from the ownership of the subsoil and the
Dominion has exclusive capacity to regulate this right."152
(d) Canals, Public Harbours and Rivers and Lake Improvements: s. 108
Public harbours and canals as enumerated in the third schedule of the
BNA Act were transferred to the Dominion by section 108.153 There has been
a great deal of litigation over the meaning of the clause "Public Harbours" but its
precise limits are still not settled.154 However, it is now settled law that the
interest transferred to the Dominion was the property in the harbours as they
existed at Union, including the property in the beds and foreshores of the
harbours.155 This was a logical and sensible approach for it would have been
impossible for the Dominion to perform such duties as conservation if it did not
own the bed of the harbour.
Although the federal government may have exclusive jurisdiction over most
harbours15 6 this does not give it a very effective weapon for pollution control
purposes. Like the other specific heads of power it merely gives the federal
government control over one very limited aspect of the problem. This may be
useful if integrated into a broader scheme, but on its own it is of no real sig-
nificance. Notwithstanding the limited nature of the federal role with respect
to harbours, it has made little or no effort to deal with the problem. Harbours
are administered by Harbour Boards under the National Harbour Board Act,15 7
and each Board is responsible for regulating harbour activity. For the Harbour
Boards to assume even the limited pollution control role assigned to them by
the constitution and Parliament they would require substantially more funds
then they are able to generate through tolls on water freight. Parliament must
decide either to bring harbours within the ambit of a federal anti-pollution
scheme or provide local boards with the financing to deal with water pollution.
152La Forest, Natural Resources, supra, note 88 at 166.
153The items in the third schedule that have a bearing on water resource planning are:
1. Canals...
2. Public Harbours.
3. Lighthouses and piers...
4. Steamboats, dredges and public vessels.
5. Rivers and lake improvements
10 .... lands set aside for general public purposes.
154La Forest, The Meaning of "Public Harbours" in the Third Schedule of the
B.N.A. Act, 1867 (1963), 41 Can. Bar Rev. 519. See also La Forest, Natural Resources,
supra, note 88.
15SHolman v. Green (1881), 6 S.C.R. 707.
156Ontario and British Columbia have recently entered into an agreement with the
federal government redefining which harbours come under federal jurisdiction and which
do not. The Ontario agreement was entered into on September 26, 1961 and put 27
harbours under federal jurisdiction.
157 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-8.
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Schedule three also gives the Dominion Parliament control over "Rivers
and Lake Improvements". By using the plural only for rivers, an argument
existed that the Constitution had assigned control over lake improvements and
the entire rivers to Parliament. Lord Herschell quickly disposed of this argu-
ment in the Fisheries case.158 He reasoned that the subjects within the schedule
were, for the most part, works or constructions, that rivers and lake improve-
ments were coupled together, and that the difficulty of determining where a river
began and ended would make such a transfer impracticable. Since Lord
Herschell's statement, the question has not arisen again and there does not seem
to be any doubt that federal control is limited to the structures and not the
rivers. Within this context, room for water pollution abatement would be
extremely limited.
(e) Conclusion
The functional powers are, as the name suggests, limited to specific activi-
ties and would play an important secondary role in an environmental protection
scheme but not a primary one. Most things that come under these heads of
power would, by their very nature, be included in any comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme. Federal legislative control over these items seems to be
relatively clear and it is difficult to envisage any jurisdictional problems with
respect to them.
IV. Conclusion
From the preceding two sections, two themes emerge: first, a need, based
on economic and social well being grounds, for a greater federal involvement
in environmental protection and secondly, the constitutionality, based primarily
on the general and criminal law powers, for such involvement. Unfortunately
the precise bounds of the federal role are difficult to map out. Certainly it should
be extensive 59 and it should comprise strong enforcement mechanism to ensure
that pollution is alleviated.
Within the parameters of a federal solution, the provinces must be free to
establish their own priorities for environmental control. Thus, effluent standards
should not be permitted to drop below the federal minimum, but they could, if
the provinces wished, be set much higher. Similarly, provincial authorities must
be free to enforce their own higher standards through their own regulatory
machinery. Disputes between provinces with differing standards could be
handled by an on going commission made up of representation from the
provinces and the federal government.1 60
158A.-G. for Canada v. A.-G. for Ontario, [1898] A.C. 700 at 710-11.
159The Canada Water Act, R.S.C. 1970, 1st supp. c. 5 and the Clean Air Act, S.C.
1970-71-72, c. 47 are important steps in the right direction, but they do not go far enough
in terms of designing and implementing a broad regulatory structure that encompasses
all the tools available to the federal government for dealing with pollution.
160This would alleviate the problem of unconstitutional provincial legislation that
imposes standards of conduct on neighbouring provinces. See Province of Manitoba v.
Interprovincial Co-operatives Ltd. et al. (1972), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 166.
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The constitutionality of a strong federal role in the environmental protec-
tion field is undisputable. Similarly, the arguments in favour of immediate federal
action in this area are compelling. What is needed now is for the federal govern-
ment to recognize these facts and take the initiative in designing and implement-
ing a comprehensive pollution control plan that will make a real contribution to
improving our natural environment.
